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CIVIL PROCEDURE—PROPERTY IMPROVEMENT CLAIMS—A HISTORY 
AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ARKANSAS’S LONE TRUE STATUTE OF 
REPOSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a common moment of both gratification and anxiety for an 
American family—the construction of a new home. Many parties are in-
volved in this process, such as the family who decides to construct the 
home, the architect, the general contractor, various subcontractors, insurance 
companies and their representatives, banks, and even the manufacturers that 
make the products used in the construction process. A successful construc-
tion requires the concerted efforts of many people.  
Unfortunately, issues frequently develop over the course of construc-
tion, or even years after construction is completed. Foundation issues may 
develop that require the homeowners to expend substantial sums of money 
to repair. A design issue may produce a leaky roof that leads to water dam-
age. Pieces of the home could even collapse or deteriorate sooner than ex-
pected. 
Determining the entities to sue for construction defects largely depends 
on the timing of the malfunction or problem. In allocating blame, the sooner 
the problem develops after the completion of the home, the more likely that 
someone involved in the construction process should be held accountable 
for the problem, for it is more likely that design or installation errors caused 
the problem. On the other hand, as time passes from the point of completion 
to the development of a problem, less blame should be placed on those who 
designed and built the structure because ordinary wear and tear may occur 
even when the structure was properly designed and constructed. 
To handle these issues of timing and responsibility for construction 
problems, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted section 16-56-112 of the 
Arkansas Code Annotated (“Statute”),1 which provides that homeowners 
may not bring suit against certain parties in the construction process after a 
specified period of time since the structure was completed. While at first 
glance the Statute appears to be a statute of limitation, the Statute is more 
appropriately characterized as a statute of repose. While this difference will 
  
 1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (LEXIS Repl. 2005). The length of the Statute renders 
it unworkable to cite completely at this point. See infra note 13. Suffice it to say that contract 
suits where damages are sought based on the design, planning, and supervision of the im-
provement must be filed within five years after substantial completion of the structure. Fur-
thermore, contract or tort actions to recover damages for personal injury or death must be 
filed within four years of the substantial completion of the structure. 
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be explored and discussed at length,2 the timer on a statute of repose begins 
to run after a stated event (here, substantial completion) rather than accrual 
of a cause of action for a statute of limitations. Legislatures enact statutes of 
repose based on the economic best interests of the public as a whole and a 
balance of the rights of plaintiffs and defendants.3 Furthermore, according to 
the Statute, it applies not only to the construction of new homes, but also to 
the construction of any improvement to real property. 
A host of problems have arisen with the Statute. The first and most sig-
nificant problem is the interpretation of the Statute’s scope. To whom does 
the Statute apply? Does the Statute apply to parties like indemnifiers or tort 
contributors? What about manufacturers of products used in the property 
improvement? Where exactly do we draw this line? Second, statutes of re-
pose are inherently different than statutes of limitation yet often confused. 
Understanding the differences will enable attorneys to advocate their posi-
tions more effectively to judges. Finally, Arkansas courts have most often 
expanded the reach and meaning of the Statute, but two relatively recent 
aberrational decisions have cut against this trend, destabilizing the courts’ 
previous consistency.4 
This note seeks to convince Arkansas students, practitioners, and 
judges that the courts should abandon these aberrational decisions and revert 
back to a broad interpretation of the Statute in order to correspond to the 
General Assembly’s purpose for enactment. To accomplish this goal, this 
note first provides the reader with an understanding of the differences be-
tween a statute of repose and a statute of limitation and why these differ-
ences are significant.5 Next, this note demonstrates how the Arkansas courts 
broadly construed the Statute for several years, only to suddenly narrow its 
interpretation in two somewhat recent decisions.6 Finally, this note argues 
that Arkansas courts should abandon its aberrational decisions and continue 
to broadly interpret the Statute as the General Assembly intended.7  
II. BACKGROUND 
Attorneys may find working with a statute of repose a bit uncomfort-
able because statutes of repose are typically encountered less frequently than 
  
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 
866 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 4. Brown v. Overhead Door Corp., 843 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Ray & Sons 
Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 216–18, 114 S.W.3d 189, 
198–200 (2003).  
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.A. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
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statutes of limitation.8 Attorneys are more accustomed to working with stat-
utes of limitation instead. In order to properly understand the issue, one 
must understand the significant differences between statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitation as well as the origin of the various construction statutes 
of repose. 
A. Statutes of Repose Versus Statutes of Limitations and Why the        
Difference Matters  
Although statutes of repose and statutes of limitation are procedurally 
related, several differences should be highlighted. Also, statutes of repose 
and statutes of limitation interplay to form a unique relationship. This sec-
tion will explore this relationship and many of the differences between these 
types of statutes and discuss much of the relevant text of the Statute in ques-
tion. 
Both statutes of repose and statutes of limitation involve the running of 
a clock that, upon reaching a certain time, precludes a plaintiff from winning 
a suit against a defendant.9 The first significant difference between the two 
is the trigger that starts the running of the clock. A statute of limitations be-
gins to run when a specific cause of action accrues to a plaintiff.10 A statute 
of repose begins to run after the happening of an event unrelated to the in-
jury in question.11   
As a result, a statute of repose may cut off a right of action before an 
injury is suffered. To illustrate, the Statute bars contract claims for property 
damage five years after substantial completion12 of the improvement and 
bars contract and tort claims for personal injury four years after substantial 
completion of the improvement.13 This means that an injury could occur five 
  
 8. See, e.g., 2 DAVID NEWBERN, JOHN J. WATKINS, & D.P. MARSHALL, JR., ARKANSAS 
CIVIL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5:11 (5th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw ARCPP (noting 
that Arkansas’s only statute of repose is the construction Statute discussed here). While Ar-
kansas has only a construction statute of repose, statutes of repose may exist in other forms. 
See also e.g., Jan Allen Baughman, Comment, The Statute of Repose: Ohio Legislators At-
tempt to Lock the Courthouse Doors to Product-Injured Persons, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 671 
(1996) (discussing Ohio’s products liability statute of repose); Laura Martin, Comment, Civil 
Procedure—Mills v. Wong: Procedural Due Process Does Not Toll the Tennessee Medical 
Malpractice Statute of Repose, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 805 (2006) (discussing Tennessee’s 
medical malpractice statute of repose). 
 9. Ray & Sons, 353 Ark. at 216–18, 114 S.W.3d at 198–200. 
 10. E.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-111(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2005) (“Actions to enforce 
written obligations, duties, or rights . . . shall be commenced within five (5) years after the 
cause of action shall accrue.”); see also Susan C. Randall, Due Process Challenges to Stat-
utes of Repose, 40 SW. L.J. 997, 1004 (1986). 
 11. Randall, supra note 10, at 1004. 
 12. See infra note 53 (determining when substantial completion occurs). 
 13. The Statute provides, 
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years after substantial completion of the improvement, and the Statute 
would prohibit the injured party from suing the protected parties.   
The second way a statute of repose differs from a statute of limitation 
is that a statute of repose “entirely cuts off an injured person’s right of ac-
tion even before it accrues.”14 While a statute of limitation allows one to 
simply avoid a suit, a statute of repose extinguishes a claim, making it non-
existent.15 In effect, then, a statute of limitation is a procedural device that 
simply bars a remedy while a statute of repose prevents an action from ever 
arising.16 A statute of repose thus creates a substantive right in the protected 
class to be free from liability after a time determined by the legislature.17     
This apparent theoretical difference has practical significance in two 
ways. First, characterizing the benefit that a statute of repose affords as a 
“right” may dissuade a judge from minimizing or narrowly construing the 
statute when an individual right may be violated as a result. Second, because 
  
 
(a) No action in contract, whether oral or written, sealed or unsealed, to recover 
damages caused by any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or obser-
vation of construction or the construction and repair of any improvement to real 
property or for injury to real or personal property caused by such deficiency, 
shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, plan-
ning, supervision, or observation of construction or the construction or repair of 
the improvement more than five (5) years after substantial completion of the im-
provement. 
 
(b)(1) No action in tort or contract, whether oral or written, sealed or unsealed, to 
recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death caused by any deficiency 
in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction or the con-
struction and repairing of any improvement to real property shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or 
observation of construction or the construction and repair of the improvement 
more than four (4) years after substantial completion of the improvement 
 
. . . . 
 
(c) The foregoing limitations shall also apply to any action for damages caused 
by any deficiency in surveying, establishing, or making the boundaries of real 
property, the preparation of maps, or the performance of any other engineering or 
architectural work upon real property or improvements to real property.  
 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (LEXIS Repl. 2005). 
 14. Ray & Sons, 353 Ark. at 217, 114 S.W.3d at 199. 
 15. Id. at 218, 114 S.W.3d at 199. 
 16. Id., 114 S.W.3d at 199. 
 17. Id., 114 S.W.3d at 199–200 (quoting First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. 
U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989)). 
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a statute of repose is not a procedural defense but a substantive right, a de-
fendant need not plead it as an affirmative defense to receive its protection.18 
The third and final difference between statutes of repose and statutes of 
limitation is the lack of tolling mechanisms for statutes of repose. Courts 
frequently toll statutes of limitation for a variety of reasons including 
fraud,19 concealment or ignorance of a cause of action,20 infancy,21 and occa-
sionally death.22 Such is not the case for statutes of repose.23 In fact, to give 
proper weight to the General Assembly’s intent of granting a substantive 
right, Arkansas courts have “consistent[ly] refus[ed] to graft judicially cre-
ated exceptions onto the statute of repose.”24 For example, the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals recently refused to adopt a “repair doctrine” that would 
toll the Statute during the time when the plaintiff attempted repairs even 
where the repairman represented that the repairs would cure the underlying 
defects.25 Furthermore, the Arkansas Court of Appeals refused to give effect 
to a private agreement between the parties that would serve to toll the Stat-
ute.26 To summarize, a statute of repose is “an absolute time limit beyond 
which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason.”27 Although 
the General Assembly has provided that fraudulent concealment tolls the 
Statute,28 Arkansas courts have refused to enact any other tolling mecha-
nisms. 
  
 18. Id. at 219, 114 S.W.3d at 200. 
 19. Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 20. Eckels v. Ark. Real Estate Comm’n, 30 Ark. App. 69, 80, 783 S.W.2d 864, 870 
(1990). 
 21. Phipps v. Martin, 33 Ark. 207, 211 (1878). 
 22. Whipple v. Johnson, 66 Ark. 204, 205, 49 S.W. 827, 828 (1899) (“The general stat-
ute of limitation of five years as to notes would not cease to run until letters of administration 
were granted upon the estate of [decedent].”). 
 23. See Rogers v. Mallory, 328 Ark. 116, 120, 941 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1997) (holding that 
no tolling mechanisms exist except fraudulent concealment, so there are no exceptions for 
residential property or reasonable length of time to bring suit). 
 24. Carlson v. Kelso Drafting & Design, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 205, at 5, 374 S.W.3d 
726, 729.   
 25. Id. at 4–5, 374 S.W.3d at 729. 
 26. First Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Black, 2011 Ark. App. 447, at 5, 2011 LEXIS 486, at *6–
7. 
 27. Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 216–
18, 114 S.W.3d 189, 198–200 (2003). 
 28. Section 16-56-112(d) of the Arkansas Code Annotated addresses fraudulent con-
cealment: 
 
The limitations prescribed by this section shall not apply in the event of fraudu-
lent concealment of the deficiency, nor shall the limitation be asserted by way of 
defense by any person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant, or oth-
erwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in the improvement 
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death. 
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Finally, while statutes of repose and statutes of limitation are distinct 
entities, statutes of repose actually work in tandem with statutes of limita-
tion, which may confuse those unfamiliar with statutes of repose. To illus-
trate, suppose that property damage occurs three years after substantial 
completion. Because Arkansas imposes a three year statute of limitation in 
negligence actions,29 plaintiffs must file suit by year six after substantial 
completion in order to satisfy the statute of limitation; however, the five-
year statute of repose would actually cut this action off in year five. If, how-
ever, the injury occurred in year one, the statute of limitation requires plain-
tiffs to bring suit by year four; therefore, plaintiffs may not rely exclusively 
on the language of the Statute to conclude that they may file in year five. As 
a result, the General Assembly enacted a provision that disallows extension 
of the applicable statute of limitation even when the facts also implicate the 
statute of repose.30 An attorney must be aware of this interplay to avoid fil-
ing too late under either statute. 
B. A Brief History of Construction Statutes of Repose 
The rise of construction statutes of repose is relatively recent, occurring 
only within the last sixty years. During the 1950s, lobbyists on behalf of 
architects, engineers, and contractors began to lobby state legislatures for 
changes in the law.31 Wisconsin adopted the first construction statute of re-
pose in 1961.32 Today, most jurisdictions within the United States have en-
acted a construction statute of repose.33 The reasons for the construction 
industry’s surge in lobbying efforts reveal why the General Assembly en-
acted the Statute. It will also play an important role in showing how the Ar-
kansas courts strayed from these purposes. 
Three particular legal developments helped spur the lobbying surge. 
First, courts around the country began to discard the privity of contract rule, 
thus allowing third-party suits against architects, engineers, and contractors 
for design deficiencies.34 Previously at common law, courts required privity 
  
 
 29. See id. § 16-56-105 (Repl. 2005). 
 30. Section 16-56-112(f) of the Arkansas Code Annotated states that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the 
bringing of any cause of action, nor shall the parties to any contract for construction extend 
the above prescribed limitations by agreement or otherwise.” 
 31. See Randall, supra note 10, at 999. 
 32. Id. at 999–1000; see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (West 1961) (current version at 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.89 (West 2012)).  
 33. Randall, supra note 10, at 1000 (noting that forty-six states and the District of Co-
lumbia had enacted construction statutes of repose by 1985). 
 34. The process began with the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 
N.E. 1050, 1056–57 (N.Y. 1916). See also Randall, supra note 10, at 1000. 
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of contract to sustain suits against architects, engineers, or contractors for 
design or construction deficiencies.35 As a result, third parties could not 
bring suit against these classes.36 Second, the courts began to abolish the 
related “completed and accepted rule” whereby no liability could attach to 
the architect, engineer, or contractor once the owner accepted the work as 
completed.37 Third, courts increasingly adopted the discovery rule for the 
triggering of statutes of limitation, which significantly delayed cause of ac-
tion accruals.38   
These three legal developments resulted in indefinite liability of a dura-
tional nature for architects, engineers, and contractors for personal and 
property injuries based on their construction work.39 For example, a contrac-
tor may be liable for work it performed several years, or even decades, ago. 
The potentially liable party may even be long retired or deceased. Indefinite 
liability certainly seemed unfair to construction-industry defendants; hence, 
they commenced lobbying efforts. 
Courts have identified several reasons why indefinite liability is unfair 
for defendants. As a result of indefinite liability, insurance costs for those in 
the construction industry skyrocketed.40 Furthermore, construction industry 
members faced difficulty in defending against old claims because of the loss 
of evidence and the unavailability of witnesses.41 Finally, state legislatures 
worried that better technology may yield higher standards of care at the time 
of trial than at the time the building was constructed several years earlier.42 
Some have even alleged that indefinite liability creates a chilling effect on 
creativity within the construction arena, causes unnecessary lawsuits, and 
hinders building innovations.43 Finally, subjecting members of the construc-
tion industry to these suits seems especially unfair when one considers that 
improvements tend to deteriorate over time, and any problem may be caused 
by negligent maintenance of the improvement outside of the construction 
  
 35. See Randall, supra note 10, at 1000. 
 36. See, e.g., Patraka v. Armco Steel Co., 495 F. Supp. 1013, 1018–19 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 
 37. For more discussion on the completed and accepted rule, see Susan C. Randall’s Due 
Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose. Randall, supra note 10, at 1000–01. Arkansas 
discarded the rule in Suneson v. Holloway Construction Co., 337 Ark. 571, 582, 992 S.W.2d 
79, 85 (1999). 
 38. Randall, supra note 10, at 1001. The discovery rule was thought to be fairer to plain-
tiffs who had not yet discovered their injuries. Of course, the commencement of the timer 
from plaintiff’s discovery of injury, rather than from when the defendant inflicted injury, 
prolonged the period of potential liability for the defendant. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Michael J. Vardaro & Jennifer E. Waggoner, Statutes of Repose—the Design Profes-
sional’s Defense to Perpetual Liability, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 697, 715 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 713. 
 42. Id. at 704. 
 43. Id. at 716–17. 
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industry member’s control.44 These reasons indicate why state legislatures 
were quick to enact statutes of repose to assist members of the construction 
industry facing indefinite liability.   
C. The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose 
Courts have wrestled with the constitutionality of these peculiar crea-
tures on several occasions. The most successful challenges have arisen not 
under the Federal Constitution but under more restrictive state constitu-
tions.45 Typically, successful challengers have attacked the statute under 
states’ open-court provisions, which guarantee citizens access to the court 
system in order to redress injuries.46 Some states have determined that bar-
ring a cause of action before it accrues violates their open-court provisions.47 
One of the most successful constitutional challenges under the open-court 
provisions involved an injury that occurred shortly before the repose period 
expired.48 Equal protection and due process challenges have been launched 
as well, often with less successful results.49   
In order to survive a potential constitutional challenge, the Arkansas 
General Assembly enacted section 16-56-112(b)(2) of the Arkansas Code 
Annotated, which gave plaintiffs extra time to file a claim if an injury oc-
curred just before the statute of repose expired.50 This additional time would 
likely protect the Statute from being declared unconstitutional. 
  
 44. Id. at 713. 
 45. Baughman, supra note 8, at 681.   
 46. Id.   
 47. Id.; see also Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625, 630 (Ariz. 1993) 
(invalidating products liability statute of repose because it violated Arizona’s open-court 
provision). But see Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207, 212–13 (Ind. 1981) (up-
holding the product liability statute of repose because the open-court provision protects only 
vested rights, and a right cannot vest after the statute of repose cuts off the cause of action). 
 48. See Randall, supra note 10, at 1006. See also Baughman, supra note 8, at 681–84 
(discussing various constitutional challenges to statutes of repose). 
 49. Baughman, supra note 8, at 681–84. 
 50. Section 16-56-112(b)(2) of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides the following: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, in the case 
of personal injury or an injury causing wrongful death, which injury occurred 
during the third year after the substantial completion, an action in tort or contract 
to recover damages for the injury or wrongful death may be brought within one 
(1) year after the date on which injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death, 
but in no event shall such an action be brought more than five (5) years after the 
substantial completion of construction of such improvement. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Although statutes of repose may allow judges a quick and convenient 
way to create docket space, judges frequently incur headaches when the 
phrase “statute of repose” appears in attorneys’ briefs for summary judg-
ment. As a question of law, judges are charged with deciding the fate of 
repose challenges, which may consist of cases that may involve tough ques-
tions. To whom does it apply? When does it apply? To what does it apply? 
In fact, the gray areas surrounding statutes of repose are larger than they 
may first appear. 
These gray areas—or the potential outer contours of a statute of re-
pose’s scope—concern judges for two related reasons that do not exist in the 
context of statutes of limitations. First, judges reject the idea of attaching 
tolling mechanisms to the statutes of repose.51 Second, state legislatures 
generally hoped to squelch the concept of indefinite liability for individuals 
in the construction industry.52 By combining this hope with the principle that 
courts should not toll statutes of repose, the idea was to provide protected 
individuals with a date after which liability could no longer attach, allowing 
them to proverbially circle their calendar.   
The remaining portion of this note addresses how the Arkansas courts 
have handled the scope of the Statute as well as a recommendation of 
change. For several decades following the Statute’s adoption, Arkansas 
courts properly construed it broadly. The Arkansas courts broadly inter-
preted the major elements of the Statute, such as the timing, improvement, 
and construction to give proper effect to the Statute’s purpose.53 However, 
  
 51. See supra Part II.A. 
 52. See supra Part II.B. 
 53. The Arkansas courts have never expounded on the meaning of another element—
substantial completion. The Arkansas Supreme Court has noted that substantial completion 
had at least occurred by the time the work was finished in accordance with the construction 
contract and the owner accepted the work. 65th Center, Inc. v. Copeland, 308 Ark. 456, 466, 
825 S.W.2d 574, 580 (1992). In the construction industry, substantial completion typically 
means “that the building or project has reached a point where it is ready for the use for which 
it was intended and that whatever work remains to be done is minor.” See NEWBERN ET AL., 
supra note 8. States use a variety of measuring sticks to determine substantial completion, 
including application of the industry standard, an owner’s acceptance of the improvement, the 
point in time that it may be used or occupied, or when actually occupied. Id. Many times 
substantial completion is not an issue because courts will often use certain paperwork sub-
missions like certificates of substantial completion to determine when substantial completion 
occurred. See 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7:174.62 (2012), available at Westlaw BOCL. Problems may develop, 
however, when parties do not exchange these certificates or when an owner-contractor con-
structs an improvement to property that the owner-contractor will later sell to another party, 
for the owner-contractor will not likely issue a certificate to itself.  
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with the decisions in Brown v. Overhead Door Corp.54 and Ray & Sons Ma-
sonry Contractors, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,55 Arkan-
sas courts quickly constricted the Statute’s application, effectively injecting 
uncertainty and risk into a law where uncertainty and risk were the primary 
targets. 
This note will next explore the trend of broad interpretation in Arkan-
sas cases. An overview of this trend serves two purposes. First, it will pro-
vide the necessary context to understand how Arkansas law stood at the time 
of the two aberrational decisions. In fact, Brown and Ray & Sons cannot be 
properly understood unless a history of Arkansas decisions regarding the 
Statute is presented first. Second, and most importantly, the trend provides 
the first reason why Arkansas courts should overrule both Brown and Ray & 
Sons. By undoing these two aberrations, Arkansas courts can return cer-
tainty to the Statute by continuing to broadly interpret the statute as they had 
done since its inception. For these reasons, the trend of broad interpretation 
will be discussed first. 
Next, this note will examine the aberrational cases that cut against this 
trend. This note proposes that Arkansas courts return to a broad interpreta-
tion of the Statute in order to confer proper weight to the General Assem-
bly’s purpose for adoption. In adopting the proposal of this note, Arkansas 
courts would return certainty to the Statute by interpreting the Statute 
broadly as they had always done, give effect to each word of the Statute, and 
act within the General Assembly’s intent for the Statute by removing the 
threat of indefinite liability.   
A. Arkansas Courts’ Interpretation of the Statute 
Arkansas first enacted the Statute in 1967.56 Excluding the two aberra-
tional decisions, the Arkansas courts broadly interpreted the Statute from its 
enactment so that it would apply in a variety of situations, even changing the 
actual text of the Statute at one point.57 Then, in two decisions, the Arkansas 
courts interpreted the Statute narrowly so that it would not apply to certain 
situations where the Statute is unclear. The next portion of this note will 
examine the trend of broad interpretation by presenting and explaining how 
Arkansas courts broadly interpreted the Statute in several decisions. Then, 
  
      54.    83 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ark. 1994).  
      55.    353 Ark. 201, 114 S.W.3d 189 (2003). 
 56. 1967 Ark. Acts 42 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (LEXIS Repl. 2005)). 
 57. For additional information about this trend, see generally J.W. Looney, When Third 
Means Fourth, Contract Includes Tort, and a Five-Year Statute of Limitation Actually Leaves 
Only Three Years or Less to File Suit: The Strange Saga of the Arkansas “Statute of Repose” 
in Construction Cases, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 87 (1993). 
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the two aberrational decisions will be inspected to show how Arkansas re-
verted from the trend despite sound policy considerations. 
1. The Trend of Broad Interpretation   
The Arkansas courts have interpreted the Statute broadly since its 
adoption. Over time, these broad interpretations increased in magnitude until 
the courts were interpreting the statute so broadly that they changed its ac-
tual text in order to achieve its purposes. What follows is an examination of 
these court decisions since the Statute’s inception. 
a. The courts’ first interpretations  
The Arkansas Supreme Court first encountered the Statute58 in Carter 
v. Hartenstein,59 which involved an elevator in an ironic locale—the Arkan-
sas Justice Building.60 The elevator crushed and killed a newspaper boy, 
prompting his mother to bring a wrongful death action against the manufac-
turer and installer of the elevator.61 The appellant challenged only the consti-
tutionality of the Statute on equal protection and due process grounds.62 The 
court dismissed the constitutional claims, classifying the arguments as “se-
mantics.”63 In addressing the constitutional claims, the court avoided delving 
into the legislative arena, stating that “[t]he court cannot—and it should not 
try to—make legislative policy in a case like this.”64   
Most importantly, the court sought to exclude two classes of individu-
als from the protection of the Statute: owners and materialmen.65 In doing 
so, the court provided little analysis beyond its conclusion. Without explana-
tion, the court provided a footnote that declared that materialmen who de-
signed components or substantial parts of a building could be protected in 
some circumstances.66 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the 
Statute broadly, eagerly dismissing constitutional arguments that succeeded 
in other jurisdictions, while narrowly interpreting the Statute to exclude ma-
  
 58. The court actually interpreted the predecessor to the contemporary version, but be-
cause the language of the Statute is identical, this note will treat it the same and call it the 
“Statute.” 
 59. 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970). 
 60. Id. at 1173, 455 S.W.2d at 919. 
 61. Id., 455 S.W.2d at 919. See supra Part II.C (containing more information on the 
constitutionality of statutes of repose). 
 62. Carter, 248 Ark. at 1174, 455 S.W.2d at 920. 
 63. Id., 455 S.W.2d at 920. 
 64. Id., 455 S.W.2d at 920. 
 65. Id. at 1175, 455 S.W.2d at 920. This exclusion gave rise to plaintiff’s equal protec-
tion argument. Id. at 1174, 455 S.W.2d at 920. 
 66. Id. at 1172, 1175 & n.*, 455 S.W.2d at 920 & n.*. 
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terialmen in certain situations and owners.67 While narrow constructions 
surfaced at the beginning, the court would retreat rapidly in subsequent de-
cisions.   
The Arkansas Supreme Court next encountered the Statute five years 
later in Cherokee Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Manly Jail Works, Inc.68 That case 
involved the definition of “improvement” because an addition to real prop-
erty must be considered an improvement for the Statute to apply.69 The ap-
pellee designed and constructed a 12,122 gallon water tank for use in the 
appellant’s carpet plant.70 The tank later ruptured, causing extensive damage 
throughout the mill.71 In determining whether the water tank constituted an 
improvement to the property, the court recognized that a “fixture” must con-
stitute an improvement for purposes of the Statute.72 The court noted the rule 
that “all things [are] to be fixtures which are attached to the realty with a 
view to the purposes for which it is held or employed.”73 The court deter-
mined that the water tank was an “improvement” according to this rule be-
cause it was put into position to act according to its purpose and intercon-
nected with other equipment in the mill.74   
Determining what constitutes an “improvement” can be done using dif-
ferent tests, but the fixture test broadens the Statute more than other tests. 
Courts that use the fixture test typically consider three factors that are often 
easily satisfied: (1) the sufficiency and mode of adaptation, (2) the adaption 
of the article to the use or improvement of the property, and (3) the intention 
of the party that annexed the article.75 The first two factors are merely evi-
dence of the third factor, which is preeminent.76 Courts will often look at the 
large size of the improvement coupled with it being used according to its 
purpose and used over a period of time.77 
On the other hand, many courts utilize a more restrictive “common-
sense” approach to determine what constitutes an improvement to real prop-
erty.78 This more narrow approach focuses on the dictionary definition of 
  
 67. Id., 455 S.W.2d at 920 & n.*. 
 68. 257 Ark. 1041, 521 S.W.2d 528 (1975). 
 69. See supra note 13. 
 70. Cherokee Carpet Mills, Inc., 257 Ark. at 1041, 521 S.W.2d at 529. 
 71. Id. at 1042, 521 S.W.2d at 529. 
 72. Id. at 1043–44, 521 S.W.2d at 530. 
 73. Id., 521 S.W.2d at 530. 
 74. Id., 521 S.W.2d at 530. 
 75. Karisch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 681. 
 78. For more information on what constitutes an “improvement” for statute of repose 
purposes as well as how courts have analyzed the problem, see William D. Bremer, Annota-
tion, What Constitutes “Improvement to Real Property” for Purpose of Statutes of Repose or 
Statute of Limitations, 122 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2004). 
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“improvement”79 and requires application of four factors: (1) whether the 
modification adds value to the property for the purposes of its intended use, 
(2) the nature of the improvement, (3) the relationship of the modification to 
the land and its occupancy, and (4) permanence.80 By including an “added 
property value” requirement to the analysis, a court will discount those im-
provements that do not add value to the property; under the fixture approach 
that the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted in Cherokee Carpet Mills, the 
court does not consider the additional value contributed by the improve-
ment.   
The commonsense approach seems to incorporate consideration of an 
important feature of an improvement. One could argue that the term “im-
provement” carries the connotation that the value to the land should be in-
creased as a result of an “improvement.” Thus, increased value should factor 
into the court’s decision.  
However, such a result may not always occur. For example, the large 
water tank in Cherokee Carpet Mills may not have added value to the prop-
erty whatsoever. The aged tank may have lowered the property value be-
cause it may have been considered a major problem to prospective buyers of 
the mill, for the sheer size and weight of the tank may render any attempt to 
remove it expensive. Additionally, one could consider the prototypical ex-
ample of a large swimming pool that actually decreases property values due 
to maintenance or removal costs. Thus, the concept of “improvement” 
should not turn on the improvement’s effect on the value of the particular 
property in question, for the Statute would protect those constructing swim-
ming pools or other similar improvements only if those improvements raised 
the value of the property. This could result in a swimming pool being an 
improvement on one property but not on the property across the street where 
the pool did not raise the property’s value. This diminishes the Statute’s 
predictability, which was a primary virtue for enacting statutes of repose. 
Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court correctly chose to adopt this broader, 
more-inclusive method of analysis for determining what constitutes an im-
provement under the Statute. 
b. The pinnacle of broad interpretation 
Although Carter and Cherokee Carpet Mills took small steps to broad 
interpretation of the Statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently be-
gan to leap. The court’s next opportunity to address the Statute occurred in 
  
 79. E.g., Adair v. Koppers Co., 741 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[A] permanent 
addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that involves the 
expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful or valuable 
as distinguished from ordinary repairs.”) (citation omitted). 
 80. Id.  
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1983, about eight years after Cherokee Carpet Mills.81 Okla Homer Smith 
Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc. involved a conflict in 
which a general contractor constructed an addition to a furniture factory, but 
the addition’s roof sustained significant damage during a storm about six 
years after substantial completion.82 The furniture store alleged that the con-
tractors negligently designed, fabricated, installed, and supervised construc-
tion of the roof, which led to property damage.83   
In arguing that the Statute did not apply, the furniture store cleverly ar-
gued, first, that subsection (a)84 applied in this instance because subsection 
(b) applied only to wrongful death or personal injury claims.85 Second, the 
furniture store argued that, according to its text, subsection (a) applies only 
to contract claims, whereas the text of subsection (b) applies to both contract 
and tort claims. Thus, according to the furniture store, since subsection (a) 
fails to mention tort suits but subsection (b) expressly mentions tort suits, 
the General Assembly must have intended that the Statute not apply to tort 
suits where only property damage occurs.86 
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected this argument by focusing on the 
legislative intent behind the Statute. The court, recognizing the problems of 
indefinite liability, averred that the legislative intent behind the Statute was 
to “[protect] persons engaged in the construction industry from being sub-
ject to litigation arising from work performed many years prior to the initia-
tion of the lawsuit.”87 The court then focused on the preamble of the act that 
adopted the Statute, which noted that the Statute was designed to protect 
against all deficiencies in designing, supervising, and constructing im-
provements.88 As a result, the court held that “contract” also encompassed 
all actions, including tort actions that arise out of a construction contract and 
that otherwise fit the requirements of the rest of the Statute.89    
As Okla Homer Smith makes clear, justices of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court thought the Statute should be interpreted broadly in order to give ef-
  
 81. Okla Homer Smith Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 646 
S.W.2d 696 (1983). 
 82. Id. at 468, 646 S.W.2d at 697. 
 83. Id., 646 S.W.2d at 697. 
 84. The court is interpreting the predecessor to the modern Statute. The language of the 
Statute is identical, but neither subsection (a) nor (b) exists in the predecessor version. The 
two provisions are found in different but adjacent sections. For the sake of clarity, this note 
refers to each by using the modern subsection rather than by outdated section numbers. See 
supra note 58. 
 85. Okla Homer Smith, 278 Ark. at 469, 646 S.W.2d at 697. See supra note 13. 
 86. Okla Homer Smith, 278 Ark. at 469, 646 S.W.2d at 697. 
 87. Id. at 470, 646 S.W.2d at 698. 
 88. Id. at 470−71, 646 S.W.2d at 698. 
 89. Id. at 471, 646 S.W.2d at 698. 
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fect to the General Assembly’s intent. What could possibly be broader than 
holding that “contract” also included tort actions? 
The Arkansas Supreme Court next encountered Elliotte v. Johnson,90 
which allowed the court to undo some of its earlier narrow-construction 
dicta. The plaintiff rented space in a shopping center that the defendant 
owned, but fire destroyed it eight years after substantial completion.91 
Touching on the dicta found in Carter,92 the plaintiff argued that the Statute 
did not apply to owners of the building.93 Despite the earlier dicta, the court 
determined that the Statute applied to owners of the improvement, especially 
when the owner contracted for the construction of the improvement and 
supervised its construction.94 The court noted that no owner/non-owner dis-
tinction can be found in the text of the Statute.95 Thus, Elliotte eradicated the 
one narrow aspect of Carter that the Statute did not apply to certain entities. 
The court has thus expanded the reach of the Statute with each case that it 
decided. 
The zenith of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s era of broad interpretation 
occurred in 1989 when the court decided Dooley v. Hot Springs Family 
YMCA.96 This case involved an individual who sued the owners, architect, 
and builder of a swimming pool for neck injuries he sustained in a diving 
incident.97 In deciding the case, the court interpreted the personal injury sub-
section of the statute, subsection (b), which carries a four year repose pe-
riod.98 Subsection (b)(2) provides an exception, however, that states that if 
injury occurs during the third year after substantial completion, injury or 
wrongful death suits may be brought within one year after the date of injury 
but in no event shall suit be brought more than five years after substantial 
completion.99 In Dooley, the injury occurred one month shy of the four year 
bar against personal injury suits, but the plaintiff filed suit just after the 
fouryear bar.100   
The court determined that the exception would be rendered meaning-
less if read literally, for if injury occurred during the third year after the im-
provement was substantially completed, then the extra year provided in sub-
section (b)(2) would never be triggered because the extra one year period 
  
 90. 285 Ark. 383, 687 S.W.2d 523 (1985). 
 91. Id. at 384, 687 S.W.2d at 523. 
 92. See supra notes 65−66. 
 93. Elliotte, 285 Ark. at 384, 687 S.W.2d at 523. 
 94. Id., 687 S.W.2d at 523.  
 95. Id., 687 S.W.2d at 523. 
 96. 301 Ark. 23, 781 S.W.2d 457 (1989). 
 97. Id. at 24, 781 S.W.2d at 457. 
 98. Id., 781 S.W.2d at 457−58. 
 99. See supra note 50. 
 100. Dooley, 301 Ark. at 24−25, 781 S.W.2d at 457−58. 
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would always expire before the four year bar in subsection (b)(1).101 Thus, 
for the extra year to carry any significance, the General Assembly must have 
intended “third” to really mean “fourth.”102 Basing its decision on the legis-
lative intent behind the statutes, the court essentially rewrote the language of 
the Statute. While it makes sense to interpret statutes logically, the court 
could have simply interpreted the Statute as it read and invited the General 
Assembly to amend it, much like the trial court in Dooley.103 Instead, the 
court interpreted the Statute so broadly that it literally changed its text in 
order to give it the role envisioned by the General Assembly.   
Finally, in East Poinsett County School District No. 14 v. Union Stan-
dard Insurance Co.,104 the court considered the effect of the Statute in rela-
tion to the applicable statute of limitations. The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that only one limitations period should apply based on the rule of 
law that if two statutes of limitations apply to the same cause of action, then 
the longest limitations period should apply.105 The court noted that the Stat-
ute is designed to work in tandem with statutes of limitations.106 Thus, the 
court again did not wish to limit the application of the Statute but instead 
desired that the Statute apply in many situations, resulting in yet another 
broad interpretation. As the cases up to this point indicate, Arkansas courts 
clearly and consistently favored broad interpretations in order to give effect 
to the General Assembly’s intent. 
2. Narrow Interpretation Aberrations 
After East Poinsett, the Arkansas courts did not confront many cases 
that presented new issues under the Statute. The few cases they decided 
simply reaffirmed earlier court decisions and principles regarding largely 
undisputed matters.107 However, Arkansas courts confronted the two aberra-
tional cases that each presented new issues under the Statute. Despite previ-
ous broad rulings, the courts interpreted the Statute narrowly, refusing to 
apply it in these new situations. 
  
 101. Id. at 25, 781 S.W.2d at 458. 
 102. Id., 781 S.W.2d at 458. 
 103. Id., 781 S.W.2d at 458. 
 104. 304 Ark. 32, 800 S.W.2d 415 (1990). 
 105. Id. at 34, 800 S.W.2d at 417. 
 106. Id., 800 S.W.2d at 417; see also supra Part II.A. 
 107. See, e.g., Zufari v. Architecture Plus, 323 Ark. 411, 417–21, 914 S.W.2d 756, 760–
62 (1996) (reaffirming the idea that the Statute works in tandem with statutes of limitation); 
Curry v. Thornsberry, 81 Ark. App. 112, 117–22, 98 S.W.3d 477, 481–84 (2003) (reaffirm-
ing the idea that only fraudulent concealment tolls the Statute). 
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a. Brown v. Overhead Door Corp. 
The Arkansas federal court case of Brown v. Overhead Door Corp. 108 
involved a manufacturer of a garage door opener.109 The garage door seri-
ously injured a two-year-old child when the door closed on him despite sen-
sors on the door that would raise the door if it met an obstruction.110 In this 
diversity suit, the court confronted the issue of whether product manufactur-
ers were within the reach of the Statute.111 Of course, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court noted in Carter that neither materialmen nor owners were within the 
reach of the Statute,112 but then later determined that owners were within the 
Statute because of a lack of distinction within the text of the Statute.113 
The federal court, however, narrowly interpreted the Statute so that it 
did not apply to product manufacturers.114 Instead, it determined that manu-
facturers were not within the Statute’s protection unless installation actually 
involved the manufacturer or the manufacturer designed or helped design 
the improvement.115 Because the product manufacturer in Brown did not 
participate in on-site installation, it received no protection from the Statute. 
b. Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court confronted the Statute again in 2003 in 
the context of indemnity contracts.116 Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors Inc., 
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. involved a suit in the general con-
tractor and subcontractor arena.117 In Ray & Sons, a general contractor that 
had constructed various Wal-Mart stores throughout several states sued 
Wal-Mart because of its failure to pay the general contractor for its serv-
ices.118 Wal-Mart refused to pay on the basis of defective construction.119 
Following settlement of the suit between Wal-Mart and the general contrac-
tor, the general contractor sued the subcontractor responsible for the defec-
  
 108. 843 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ark. 1994). 
 109. Id. at 483. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 483−84. 
 112. See supra notes 65−66. 
 113. See supra notes 94−95. 
 114. See Brown, 843 F. Supp. at 490−91. 
 115. Id. at 490. 
 116. Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 207 
114 S.W.3d 189, 193 (2003).  
 117. Id., 114 S.W.3d at 193.  
 118. Id. at 208, 114 S.W.3d at 193. 
 119. Id., 114 S.W.3d at 193. 
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tive construction under a breach of indemnity contract theory.120 The court 
narrowly interpreted the Statute and concluded that it did not cover indem-
nity contracts.121 The following section will explain why the courts in Brown 
and Ray & Sons incorrectly interpreted the Statute narrowly and will call on 
the courts to reverse course in subsequent decisions. 
B. Why Arkansas Courts Should Broadly Interpret the Statute and     
Abandon Brown and Ray & Sons 
The Arkansas courts should reconsider their holdings in both Brown 
and Ray & Sons for a number of reasons. As noted previously, a primary 
reason for reconsidering Brown and Ray is to make those decisions consis-
tent with the trend of broad interpretation that the Statute garnered since its 
adoption. A broad interpretation of a statute of repose is desirable because of 
the substantive nature of the protection that the statute of repose provides 
defendants at the specific and intentional consideration of the General As-
sembly. In other words, a statute of repose, unlike a statute of limitation, is 
the General Assembly’s specific balance of rights between parties and 
should be given effect where possible. Courts should not narrow the scope 
on statutes of repose because they would override the General Assembly’s 
clear intent. Accordingly, the first reason for undoing Brown and Ray & 
Sons is for the sake of consistency with prior Arkansas decisions, which 
would reintroduce certainty by giving parties notice that the Statute will be 
interpreted broadly and applied where possible.  
The next reason for reconsidering Brown and Ray & Sons and returning 
to broad interpretation is that both decisions ignore a small yet important 
word in the Statute: “any.” The Statute prohibits suits arising from any defi-
ciency in the improvement made by any person.122 The Arkansas Supreme 
Court in Okla Homer Smith focused on this important word.123 The court 
focused on the General Assembly’s prohibition of “any” suit arising out of a 
construction contract to bridge the wide divide between “contract” and 
“negligence.”124 The court held that the use of “any” indicated the General 
Assembly’s far-reaching intent for the Statute, and if the court was to ignore 
“any” and hold that negligence cases did not fall within the Statute, then the 
court would contravene the purpose of enactment and completely frustrate 
the General Assembly’s intent.125 
  
 120. Id. at 208–10, 114 S.W.3d at 193–95. 
 121. Id. at 223, 114 S.W.3d at 202. 
 122. See supra note 13. 
 123. Okla Homer Smith Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 471, 
646 S.W.2d 696, 698 (1983). 
 124. Id., 646 S.W.2d at 698. 
 125. Id., 646 S.W.2d at 698. 
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Other courts have focused on the power of “any” in making determina-
tions under their state’s construction statute of repose. For example, the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently decided Fleck v. KDI Sylvan 
Pools, Inc.,126 in which “any” was of critical importance.127 In Fleck, the 
defendant sold an above-ground swimming pool where a person was later 
injured.128 Interpreting a similar Pennsylvania statute of repose, the court 
focused on “any” and noted that it “is generally used in the sense of ‘all’ or 
‘every’ and its meaning is most comprehensive.”129 Because the pool seller 
furnished construction of the pool and contracted with someone to construct 
it, the pool seller was “any” person that supervised or observed the construc-
tion and was protected by the Statute.130   
To reach its conclusion, the Fleck court relied in part on Catanzaro v. 
Wasco Products, Inc.131 In Catanzaro, where a Pennsylvania court deter-
mined that a skydome manufacturer/seller fell within the reach of the statute 
of repose.132 The Fleck court found Catanzaro persuasive in its rejection of 
the argument that the supplier had to customize the product for the specific 
real estate and actually assist in the installation.133 According to the Catan-
zaro court, the manufacturer of an improvement, even if off-site, was never-
theless “any” person that planned, designed, or built the skydome.134 The 
location where construction occurs, whether off-site or not, should not mat-
ter for repose purposes because the language of the construction statute of 
repose does not contain such a distinction.135 
The Brown court disagreed with the “any”-focused approach and held 
that manufacturers were not within the Statute’s reach.136 The court noted 
that manufacturers that do not install or design their products should not 
receive protection.137 However, this holding contradicts the text of the Stat-
ute because the Statute protects any person who constructs an improvement 
to real property. It should not matter whether construction of the improve-
ment occurs on-site or off.   
Some courts have argued that manufacturers of products are different 
because they often supply standardized goods susceptible to quality con-
  
 126. 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 127. Id. at 115. 
 128. Id. at 111–12. 
 129. Id. at 115. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 489 A.2d 262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 132. Id. at 266. 
 133. Fleck, 981 F.2d at 115. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra note 13. 
 136. Brown v. Overhead Door Corp., 843 F. Supp. 482, 488−89 (W.D. Ark. 1994). 
 137. Id. at 490. 
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trol.138 Apparently, because manufacturers are thus better able to guard 
against potential hazards that their products may cause, legislators must not 
have considered them worthy of statute of repose protection. 
This argument fails for a few reasons. First, the text of statutes of re-
pose include “any” person and does not create a manufacturer exception.139 
Second, manufacturers of improvements to real property suffer from the 
same deleterious effects of indefinite liability that state legislatures sought to 
curb. Third, by insulating only some members of the construction industry, 
the repose statutes create problems in that manufacturers cannot implead 
parties like installers or contractors who may actually be at fault for the 
problem that developed. For example, improper installation may have ren-
dered the product dangerous, but because installers are protected and manu-
facturers are not, manufacturers may have to answer for installer mistakes 
despite that installer mistakes often, but not always, manifest themselves 
soon after substantial completion.140 Statutes of repose do not command 
such odd results and should thus not be construed in this manner.141 
Thus, the Brown holding that the Statute does not protect product 
manufacturers should be reconsidered so as to give proper weight to the text 
of the Statute, most specifically the word “any.” Immunity should turn on 
the defendant’s connection to the improvement itself and not on the type of 
service that the defendant performed or the product the defendant pro-
vided.142 Like the court did with Carter’s reference to owners in Elliotte, the 
court should undo Carter’s dicta about materialmen. The text of the Statute 
commands such a result. 
  
 138. See, e.g., Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 800 F. Supp. 1430, 
1435 (E.D. Tex. 1992). 
 139. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2003) (“No action in con-
tract . . . shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing . . . .”) (emphasis 
added).  
 140. Of course, this situation assumes that installers have previously agreed to indemnify 
the manufacturer. 
 141. Some commentators contend that the legislative history of statutes of repose actually 
command this manufacturer distinction. E.g., Brian D. Shannon, The Reach for Repose: Have 
the Texas Courts Gone Awry?, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 195 (1993). Shannon focuses on 
Texas’s statute of repose and the change in its language over time as well as the fact that no 
product manufacturers testified before the Texas Legislature when it considered enacting the 
statute of repose, implying that no protection should be afforded. Id. at 215−20. Of course, 
changes in Texas’s statute of repose may indicate certain legislative intent for Texas, but this 
argument would not apply to Arkansas’s Statute. Furthermore, laws are designed to protect 
those entities that are within the text of the law itself, not who testifies before the enacting 
body. It seems safe to assume that many proper laws protect individuals and classes who did 
not actually lobby or appear before the enacting assembly. 
 142. See First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 
865 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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The third reason for reconsidering Brown and Ray & Sons is that the 
courts upset the balance that the General Assembly struck. The General As-
sembly chose three and four years as good balances of the concerns of plain-
tiffs and defendants. The courts, however, have upset this balance not by 
creating tolling mechanisms that would obviously upset the legislative pur-
pose of the Statute, but by simply circumventing the Statute by applying it 
narrowly.143 Courts re-inject uncertainty and the specter of indefinite liabil-
ity when they create tolling mechanisms or interpret the Statute narrowly. 
While the courts have chided tolling mechanisms, they have not done so for 
narrow interpretations, yet both frustrate legislative intent when construction 
industry members can no longer “circle the calendar.”   
Some have contended that statutes of repose should be interpreted nar-
rowly like a statute of limitation because the courts are extinguishing a 
plaintiff’s right.144 However, statutes of repose serve entirely different func-
tions, which are to provide certainty and defeat indefinite liability for mem-
bers of the construction industry.145 The General Assembly struck a particu-
lar balance, and a narrow interpretation only frustrates the General Assem-
bly’s intent. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted ironically in 
Ray & Sons that,  
[a] statute of repose creates a substantive right in those protected to be 
free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time. . . . 
Statutes of repose are based on considerations of the economic best in-
terests of the public as a whole and are substantive grants of immunity 
based on a legislative balance of the respective rights of potential plain-
tiffs and defendants struck by determining a time limit beyond which li-
ability no longer exists.146 
Furthermore, when a plaintiff’s right to sue is extinguished, a defendant 
receives a reciprocal right not to be sued. Thus, in interpreting the Statute, 
why favor the plaintiff when it appears that the legislature desired to favor 
the defendant in a situation where it perceived normal procedural laws un-
fairly tipped the scales against the defendant? 
The problem with the narrow interpretations are illustrated in Ray & 
Sons, in which the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that suits for in-
demnity do not fall within the Statute’s reach.147 As in Ray & Sons, it is 
common for a subcontractor to agree to indemnify the general contractor for 
  
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. Okla Homer Smith Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc., 278 Ark. 467, 472, 
646 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Adkisson, C.J., dissenting).  
 145. See supra Part II.B. 
 146. Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 Ark. 201, 218, 
114 S.W.3d 189, 199–200 (2003) (quoting First United Methodist Church, 882 F.2d at 866).  
 147. Id. at 208–10, 114 S.W.3d at 193–95.  
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any loss suffered by the general contractor pursuant to a suit regarding the 
subcontractor’s work.148 
With little explanation, the Ray & Sons court concluded that earlier Ar-
kansas court cases had never construed the Statute in the context of an in-
demnity provision.149 To avoid the Statute, the court characterized the case 
as a breach of contract dispute instead of a claim of defective construc-
tion.150 The problem with this characterization, however, is that one could 
always argue in construction cases that only a breach of contract occurred. 
In fact, the problem that gave rise to the suit, or the condition precedent, was 
a deficiency in an improvement to property. Because the deficiency was the 
event that resulted in liability, Ray & Sons should have been characterized 
like every other construction deficiency case. 
Interestingly enough, the court provided no justification for approv-
ingly citing a South Carolina case151 for the proposition that contribution 
actions fall within a construction statute of repose.152 Due to the similar na-
tures of contribution and indemnity suits, it seems odd that the Statute would 
protect one but not the other. Indemnity and contribution both allow a de-
fendant subject to suit to seek reimbursement from a third party. In both 
cases, the condition precedent to liability was the construction deficiency. It 
is illogical and inconsistent to allow third party contributors to receive pro-
tection from the Statute while third party indemnifiers are exposed to liabil-
ity. Although indemnity is based on contract and contribution on tort, the 
court determined in Okla Homer Smith that this distinction should not matter 
in the context of the Statute, for to hold otherwise would frustrate the Gen-
eral Assembly’s purpose.153   
Furthermore, the indemnifying parties are typically the very parties that 
the General Assembly sought to protect. Even though these parties agree to 
indemnify, they should not necessarily expect that this indemnity obligation 
should carry indefinitely into the future, especially when one considers that 
state legislatures have recognized that improvements may suffer problems 
due to negligent maintenance or installation. The court frustrates the legisla-
tive intent of the Statute by injecting uncertainty and indefinite liability, 
which the General Assembly sought to eradicate. 
The final reason for reconsidering Brown and Ray & Sons is that they 
are aberrations of the general trend of broad interpretation. The courts pre-
  
 148. Id., 114 S.W.3d at 193–95. 
 149. Id., 114 S.W.3d at 193–95. 
 150. Id. at 223, 114 S.W.3d at 202. 
 151. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Interkal, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 866 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 152. Ray & Sons, 353 Ark. at 218−19, 114 S.W.3d at 200 (quoting Florence Cnty. Sch. 
Dist. No. 2, 559 S.E.2d at 869).  
 153. See supra notes 82−89. 
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viously interpreted the Statute broadly for several decades.154 Thus, for the 
sake of consistency, the Arkansas courts should overturn these decisions 
when given the opportunity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
State legislatures throughout the country responded to legal changes in 
construction law by enacting construction statutes of repose to protect con-
struction industry members from indefinite liability and its consequential 
evils. While the idea of a statute of repose was a bit novel, most enactments 
have, nonetheless, survived constitutional attacks because courts recognized 
their importance and rationale. Arkansas, for many years following the Stat-
ute’s enactment, interpreted the Statute broadly to give proper weight to the 
General Assembly’s intent. Then, in Brown v. Overhead Door Corp. and 
Ray & Sons Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., the courts suddenly reversed course. This reversal contradicts the text 
of the Statute itself, the legislative purpose of the Statute, and ruins the Ar-
kansas courts’ interpretative consistency. For these reasons, Arkansas courts 
should abandon Brown and Ray & Sons if given the opportunity and return 
to broadly interpreting the Statute. 
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